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The franchise relationship in China: Agency and institutional 
theory perspectives 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The number of franchise outlets in China is estimated to grow to 800,000 by 2016, creating 
more than 10 million jobs (China Daily, 2011). These figures rival current US statistics where 
franchising accounts for more than 50% of retail and service revenue and 14% of private 
sector employment (Franchiseek, 2011). Franchising in China is a relatively new 
phenomenon (Wang, Zhu and Terry, 2008); the franchise relationship, and the resulting 
constructs of power, control, support and conflict, remain under-researched.  
 
Franchising theory has been developed in the context of franchise systems operating in 
market economies with established institutional structures (Dant, 2008; Holmberg and 
Morgan, 2003; Kedia et al., 1994; Meek et al., 2011). The economic perspective provided by 
agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) dominates the literature (Barthelemy, 2008; 
Castrogiovanni et al., 2006a, 2006b; Combs et al., 2004a). A sociological viewpoint such as 
that provided by institutional theory has the potential to explain elements of the franchise 
relationship which the economic perspective alone overlooks (Shane and Foo, 1999; Combs 
et al. 2009; Barthelemy, 2011).  
 
In this paper we seek to discover aspects of franchise relationships in China that are not fully 
reflected in current theoretical understanding. By employing both economic and sociological 
approaches we provide a holistic understanding of the franchising relationship in a dynamic, 
developing economy. By providing evidence from both franchisors and franchisees we offer 
a more robust view of the franchise relationship. This contributes to redressing the imbalance 
in extant research which is dominated by the franchisor viewpoint. 
 
The Franchise Relationship  
 
Grunhagen and Dorsch (2003, p.367) contend that “the franchisor-franchisee relationship 
represents a partnership conducted as a form of relational exchange”. Relationship building 
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involves sharing of benefits and costs. The formal basis of the relationship is the franchise 
contract. The franchisor provides the franchisee with the right to sell products or services. In 
business format franchising this includes use of a brand name owned by the franchisor. In 
return for a lump sum payment and an annual royalty fee based on sales, the franchisor gives 
the franchisee the right to use this intellectual property for a specified time period. The 
franchisee, in return for franchise fees, expects to operate in a supported and assisted 
environment (Fulop and Forward, 1997). Rahatullah and Raeside (2008, p.27) describe 
relational exchange relationships as “durable, dynamic, and adaptable”, emphasizing that the 
relationship constructs of support, power and control, facilitate “an effective, efficient, and 
long-lasting dyadic relationship”.    
 
The foundational work on power by French and Raven (1959), and later work by Lusch 
(1976) and Gaski (1984) provide the basis for understanding power within the franchise 
channel. This early franchise research is US market focused, while later authors explore 
relational constructs in the franchise relationship in developed markets outside of the US: 
Australia and the UK (Quinn, 1999; Quinn and Doherty, 2000; Frazer et al., 2007; Brookes 
and Roper, 2011). These authors emphasize controlling the franchise relationship through 
non-coercive power sources, such as support mechanisms, rather than coercive sources of 
power, such as the contract (Quinn and Doherty, 2000; Brookes and Roper, 2011).  
 
In international franchise relationships, communication, trust and the choice of franchise 
partner are important sources of power (Doherty and Alexander, 2006; Doherty, 2009). 
Moore et al. (2004) support Lusch (1982) in finding that cultural disconnection is a key 
source of conflict with international partners. They also find that channel members’ 
willingness to exert coercive power does not encourage healthy channel relationships (Moore 
et al., 2004). Doherty and Alexander (2006) and Quinn (1999) assert that non-coercive power 
sources, particularly collaborative decision making, produce better franchise relationships.  
 
In exploring sources of conflict, Frazer et al. (2012) highlight the tensions which emanate 
from expectation gaps at the outset of the relationship, distrust in the relationship, relational 
dissatisfaction and perceptions of conflict. However, these authors further perpetuate the 
focus on developed market economies with established legal and social frameworks. Detailed 
consideration of the dynamics within the franchise relationship in markets with emerging 
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economies, evolving legal frameworks and rapidly changing social expectations remains 
under-researched. 
 
Theoretical Frameworks 
Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) is based on the concept of the principal-agent 
relationship: the principal delegates work to the agent to be carried out on the principal’s 
behalf on a day-to-day basis. Two agency problems arise in this context: horizontal and 
vertical agency (Combs et al. 2004a).  The horizontal agency problem concerns the franchise 
brand and the potential for free riding by franchisees (Brickley and Dark, 1987; Kidwell et 
al., 2007). The vertical agency problem concerns the potential for employees to act self 
interestedly against the wishes of management (Combs et al., 2004a; Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Franchisees are not employees and will not shirk because income is directly related to 
effort: they are profit motivated. Employees require closer monitoring than franchisees; 
therefore, franchising is expected to reduce monitoring costs (Rubin, 1987). However, the 
potential for opportunism and moral hazard remains. On the double agency problem Combs 
et al. (2004a, p.912) conclude: “geographic dispersion creates two problems for chain 
managers. They must motivate and monitor outlet managers to solve vertical agency and they 
must insure that investments in the brand are maintained to solve horizontal agency.” 
 
Control, power, monitoring and the resultant potential for conflict are implicit in agency 
theory. A hierarchical, dependent relationship characterizes this theoretical perspective. 
Barthelemy (2011) concludes that agency theory alone does not fully explain how the 
franchise relationship operates in practice. Franchise relationships may be further explained 
by institutional theory, with its emphasis on the institutions and culture which shape the 
business environment (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995, 2008).  
 
TAKE IN TABLE I HERE 
 
North (1990), Di Maggio and Powell (1983) and Scott (1995, 2008) are the key protagonists 
of what is known as new institutionalism. Scott (1995, 2008), taking a sociological 
perspective, defines institutions as comprising “regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive 
elements that, together with associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning 
to social life” (Scott, 2008, p.48). These regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive systems 
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are known as Scott’s three pillars of institutions and form the basis for legitimacy. These 
systems may be in conflict at any one time and are not necessary mutually reinforcing. Here 
it is worth quoting Scott (2008): “The regulatory emphasis is on conformity to rules: 
legitimate organizations are those established by and operating in accordance with relevant 
legal or quasi-legal requirements. A normative conception stresses a deeper, moral base for 
assessing legitimacy. Normative controls are more likely to be internalized than are 
regulative controls, and the incentives for conformity are hence likely to include intrinsic as 
well as extrinsic rewards. A cultural-cognitive view points to the legitimacy that comes from 
conforming to a common definition of the situation, frame or reference….[it] is the “deepest” 
level, because it rests on preconscious, taken-for-granted assumptions” (Scott, 2008, p.61). 
 
Shane and Foo (1999) find that new franchise system survival is better explained when 
employing institutional explanations alongside economic reasons. In their US sample, 
franchise survival is more likely where there is cognitive legitimacy; that is, taken-for-
grantedness derived from an established shared understanding (Shane and Foo, 1999). 
‘Certification by the media’, that is, socio-political approval by the media in the form of 
published franchisor rankings, plays a key role in legitimizing franchisors. Those US states 
which have disclosure and termination laws help franchisors attract franchisees by protecting 
them against opportunistic and/or financially risky franchisors (Shane and Foo, 1999).  
 
Combs et al. (2009, p.1270) also find that “social forces described by institutional theory add 
explanatory power beyond that offered by economic explanations”. Barthelemy (2011) 
provides evidence of mimetic isomorphism, that is, franchise chains imitating the behaviour 
of competitors which moves the system towards a taken-for-grantedness position. Like the 
work of Combs et al. (2009), Barthelemy’s contribution is focused on the decision to 
franchise and the mix of franchise and owned stores in a franchise chain.  Shane and Foo 
(1999) and Combs et al. (2009) explore these ideas in a US context; France provides the 
location for Barthelemy’s (2011) contribution. In both countries franchising is a long 
established organizational form operationalized in the context of legitimizing frameworks. 
However, Combs et al. (2009, p.1283) assert that “institutional theory is most relevant when 
uncertainty is high, relative to economic imperatives.”  
 
The developing nature of franchising in China presents a pertinent site to explore economic 
and social influences within the franchise relationship. Therefore, we consider the developing 
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franchise relationship, rather than issues such as the decision to franchise or move to 
company outlets, which have dominated the franchise debate. In China, institutional 
mechanisms are still evolving: private enterprises were legalized in 1988 (Lu and Tao, 2010). 
As Tan et al. (2009: 546) note “the formal, regulatory, coercive institutional mechanisms that 
under gird a market economy like property rights, company law and contracts, legal 
frameworks for managing and settling disputes, and concomitant sanctions are still evolving, 
or in some instances non-existent.”   
 
Franchising in China 
 
Dant (2008) highlights the North American dominance of franchising research. The challenge 
of emerging economies has attracted researchers (Welsh et al., 2006), although research to 
date has provided very little primary data collection and analysis of how the franchise 
relationship in China operates. Establishing an understanding of the regulatory pillar is the 
first step in providing a context for the current work.  
 
Wang et al. (2008) provide a concise histo ical account of how franchising has developed in 
China.  They distinguish three stages of franchise development: stage one (1987-1992), the 
introduction of the franchise concept with the arrival of US fast food pioneers; stage two 
(1993-1997), the adoption of franchising by local enterprises; stage three (1998-2006), the 
rapid growth of franchising and associated problems. As franchising developed, problems 
arose “from a lack of understanding of franchising and the intricacies of the 
franchisor/franchisee relationship” (Wang et al., 2008: 172/3). Table II outlines consequent 
development of franchise regulation in China.  
 
TAKE IN TABLE II HERE 
 
With some ambiguity in the 2005 Franchise Measures, the 2007 Franchise Regulations were 
introduced to address a range of issues including full disclosure of information to franchisees 
by franchisors and the combating of fraud. The importance of support for franchisees is 
highlighted in the 2007 Regulations. It is seen as fundamental to the long-term development 
of franchising in China. Having provided this background, the paper now presents the 
methods employed, data collection and analysis techniques.    
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Methodology 
 
Research position 
Elango and Fried (1997, p.77) advocate fine grained approaches to franchise research: “the 
actual operations of a franchising system have rarely been directly examined”. The last 
decade witnessed a growth in the use of qualitative methods in retail franchising research: 
ethnography (Quinn, 1999), case studies (Doherty, 2009) and in-depth interviews (Moore et 
al., 2004). By employing in-depth interviews with franchisors and franchisees in the retail 
sector in China we seek to develop an understanding of franchising in a dynamic economic 
and social environment. Qualitative research is particularly challenging, especially with 
regard to company access. The access achieved is deemed to be a particular strength of the 
work presented here.  
 
Sample selection and securing access 
When conducting research on business activities in China it is important to establish a 
relationship, usually through referral, with potential respondents (Bruton and Ahlstrom, 
2003). Two institutions were deemed to be central to advancing the work; the China Chain 
Store and Franchise Association (CCFA) and the government authority in the region where 
the research was carried out, the Guangdong Provincial Administration for Industry and 
Commerce. 
 
The China Chain Store and Franchise Association (CCFA) provides a range of information 
and services on retailing generally, and franchising specifically. It deems itself to be the 
official representative of the retailing and franchising industry in China, with a membership 
that includes domestic retailers, international retailers, franchisors, suppliers and other related 
organizations (CCFA, 2011). The CCFA membership database provided the best opportunity 
for identifying those retail franchise organizations which would fit with the case selection 
criteria:  
 
Selection Criterion 1: Operate in China in the retail sector via franchising 
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Selection Criterion 2: Operate within a confined geographical area in order to minimize 
variation from external influences. The area of the Pearl River Delta was chosen for the 
current work 
Selection Criterion 3: Have experience of at least one year franchising in the retail sector 
in China. Both international and domestic retailers were eligible. 
 
The CCFA has many divisions operating on a provincial basis in China and CCFA 
Guangdong represents the CCFA in this province. Guangdong Provincial Administration for 
Industry and Commerce is the key governmental department mainly responsible for 
regulating the circulation of goods, investigating and enforcing any trade mark infringements 
with responsibility for all trademark management for all industrial and commercial 
enterprises. In the chain store and franchise industry, the department works closely with the 
CCFA to regulate the franchise companies in the area of Guangdong province.  
 
Initial contact was made with the CCFA and Guangdong Provincial Administration for 
Industry and Commerce. Via personal contacts, two CCFA Guangdong consultants were 
already known to the research team. While both contacts had been working closely with the 
member companies of CCFA in Guangdong province, they could not directly access 
companies without the authorisation of the higher administration of CCFA Guangdong. In 
order to approach the higher administration, it was advised that it was necessary to seek 
support from the government. The government department was initially approached through a 
different personal contact. Once senior officers understood the nature of the research project 
and offered their consent for support, the two CCFA Guangdong consultants were then 
authorised to help make initial contacts with target companies. 
 
Using the CCFA database twenty-five retail franchisors were found to fit with the preceding 
criteria and were contacted via telephone to explain the purpose of the research and request 
interviews with key personnel. Five companies refused to participate in academic research 
due to concerns over the protection of sensitive commercial information. No response was 
received from two organizations leaving eighteen retail franchisors. Following initial phone 
calls to the franchisors by the CCFA consultants, phone calls were then made by one of the 
researchers to specific personnel to confirm the time, venue and form of the interviews. 
Following this process twelve franchisors gave their final agreement to participate in the 
research. 
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Franchisee access was secured via franchisors. Some franchisees were reluctant to participate 
in interviews, therefore it was not possible to secure access with both franchisors and 
franchisees in all twelve companies. As the work focuses on the franchise relationship, only 
the nine retail franchise organizations where access to both franchisors and franchisees was 
secured are included in this paper. Given the nature of doing research in China it was deemed 
appropriate to secure access to firms at the outset, but during the course of the research a 
consistent picture of the franchise relationship in China began to develop, reflecting a 
replication logic as advanced by Eisenhardt (1989). Details of the nine retail franchise 
organizations are provided in Table III.  
 
TAKE IN TABLE III HERE 
 
Data collection and data analysis 
The broad research objective is to identify the central tenets of the franchise relationship in 
China. The setting of this objective follows the guidance of Eisenhardt (1989) on the 
collection of qualitative data. Table IV highlights the key thematic issues explored in both 
franchisor and franchisee interviews. To ensure consistency of structure during the course of 
interviewing, interviews were guided by an inventory of issues tightly pertaining to the 
research objective. As the interviews progressed, further questions and prompts followed 
when there were additional and complementary issues raised by respondents.  
 
TAKE IN TABLE IV 
 
Interviews were held in Chinese and detailed hand written notes were also taken. Interviews 
were tape-recorded upon the consent of the informants and each interview was transcribed in 
Chinese and carefully translated from Chinese into English. To ensure the reliability of 
transcription, two transcribers who are indigenous mainland China nationals with business 
studies qualifications carried out the task of transcribing the interviews. The transcribers were 
instructed to independently translate the tape-recorded content of each interview word-by-
word using exactly the same wording as originally used by respondents. Transcripts were 
compared and when there were differences the original interview tape was listened to again 
and the hand written notes were double checked. This procedure continued until full 
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agreement was reached. In order to ensure confidentiality, companies were coded A to I and 
their names replaced in the transcript. 
 
The final transcript was then translated into English. To ensure that the translation was 
precise and closely adhered to the original Chinese wording, five independent translators 
were instructed to carry out the task. They were all doctoral level Chinese native speakers and 
had been residents in the UK for more than three years. To ensure the consistency of 
specialised terms in translation, translators were provided with a reference that stipulated the 
Chinese and the corresponding English, such as “特許行銷” for “franchising”, “物流系統” 
for “logistics system” and so on. The five translated transcripts were then scrutinized and 
compared side by side. A final version of English translation was then attained for each 
interview.  
 
Following transcription interviews were analyzed using manual analytic coding by which the 
integrity of the data and findings were protected (Doherty and Alexander, 2004, 2006). 
Following Saldaña (2009), the coding process leading to the emergence of themes from the 
data developed in three stages: (1) Pre-coding; (2) Developing analytical coding (3) 
Categorizing. Pre-coding is intended to capture a sense of the various issues embedded in the 
data during the first reading of the texts (Saldaña, 2009). Pre-coding was followed by 
descriptive coding. Descriptive coding is given as the notation of the basic information and 
context of respondents (Miles and Huberman, 1994). The descriptive codes are included in 
Table III.  
 
Analytical codes can be either developed in advance based on existing literature or 
framework, or in an ad hoc fashion, where codes are driven by immediate materials and data 
(Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009). To conform to the primary purpose of the study, analytical 
codes were developed according to emerging themes and issues from data rather than 
predetermined. The procedure for analytical coding followed the guidance provided by 
Saldaña (2009) by firstly generating preliminary codes and then achieving analytical codes. 
Categorizing was carried out after analytical coding. Saldaña (2013, p.9) employs Grbich’s 
definition, noting it is a process that permits data to be “segregated, grouped, regrouped and 
relinked in order to consolidate meaning and explanation” (Grbich, 2007, p.21). Codes that 
share similar concerns, similar topics or indicate similar patterns were then organised and 
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sorted into the same category. During the course of the categorizing process, themes emerged 
from constant cross-dyad comparison between categories and codes. Emerging themes were 
then compared to generate the recurring themes which were most revealing of data and 
pertinent to the central research question. These themes are presented in the findings section 
below. 
 
Findings and analysis 
 
Franchise forms 
The type of franchising practiced by the case companies proved crucial in determining how 
the franchise relationship operates. In the literature, business format franchising is taken to be 
the accepted franchise form. This is not found to be the case in this study as two different 
forms of franchising are being practiced. Of the nine companies, five practice business format 
franchising (A, B, C, G and I) where business systems, brand and retail format are key 
characteristics. A, B, and C are shopping goods chains; G and I are convenience store chains. 
Company A is the only international franchisor. The other four are domestic franchisors. 
Companies, D, E, F and H, convenience store franchisors, do not employ business format 
franchising. They employ a franchise form focused on product supply and distribution. 
Business systems, characteristic of business format franchising, are absent. 
 
Motivations to enter the franchise relationship 
For the franchisor, there are five driving forces behind engagement in franchise relationships. 
These are: an accelerated rate of store replication and market expansion through the injection 
of resources from the franchisee, competitive advantage facilitated by the franchisee’s 
embedded local knowledge and property base, the opportunity to focus on core business 
competencies, creation of economies of scale and, in some cases, opportunism. For 
franchisees, the key motivating issues are: lack of entry and withdrawal barriers, benefits 
derived from partner resources, saving time and effort in developing own store networks, 
relevance of the business to the franchisees’ prior experience and strength of the brand.  
 
Above all, both franchisors and franchisees recognize the importance of a strong brand in 
attracting franchisees:  
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We believe that our brand is the main reason for the franchisees to come to us... a 
brand built on tradition and reliability, good products and loyal customers. 
(Company B, franchisor respondent) 
 
 
Power and control in the relationship 
Franchisor power. Franchisor power, and potential lack of power, is derived from a range of 
dimensions: the contract, the brand, possession of market information and system 
infrastructure. The presence of a recognised brand allows franchisors to be confident in 
recruiting franchisees. Franchisors operating a strong brand via business format franchising 
are more likely to use coercive power to control franchisees: 
When franchisees get caught behaving outside the rules and regulations, warning 
and coercion will be given to the franchisee. (Company I, franchisor respondent) 
 
Franchisor power is enhanced through the acquisition of market information. Where the 
franchisor lacks market information the firm is much more dependent on the franchisee, 
creating an imbalance in the relationship:  
The franchisee knew that we relied on his contacts to get into the market. As a result, 
he thought he had the privilege to challenge or even refuse our instruction… I thought 
any company like us at an early stage of market entry would inevitably encounter the 
same situation we did. (Company H, franchisor respondent) 
 
Stable franchise system infrastructure strengthens franchisor power and is crucial in the 
development of franchise relationships. The opposite is also the case: failure in franchise 
system infrastructure encourages non-compliance behaviour:  
We know that some franchisees purchase products from other suppliers behind our 
backs. Punishment and threat are definitely not the right way to eliminate their 
activities… What we can do is to keep learning from others and improving our 
systems… If you are not good enough at performing your responsibilities well, you do 
not have the position to enforce franchisees’ compliance with instruction. (Company 
F, franchise manager) 
 
Franchisee power. A key determinant of franchisee power is information exchange between 
franchisees: 
The company has to be aware that we franchisees would communicate with each 
other. If they (the company) did something bad to us, it would be soon known by all of 
us (the franchisees)… (Company G, franchisee respondent) 
 
Information exchange as a source of franchisee power deters some franchisors from 
organising meetings of franchisees: 
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We have every reason to be proud of the arrangement of the annual meeting, because 
not so many franchisors can do this, because this requires a lot of confidence in the 
company’s performance on operations and the quality of the relationship with 
franchisees… I know some franchisors have never organised a franchisee gathering, 
because they are afraid that franchisees would spread negative comments. (Company 
I, franchisor respondent) 
 
Company E’s experience indicates that franchisees with prior business experience are more 
difficult to manage. Company G suggests experienced franchisees are “too smart to control”. 
Franchisors, particularly from the convenience store sector, prefer franchisees with no 
previous experience of franchising. While a franchisee possessing stores in key locations is 
attractive to the franchisor, a very profitable store operation is an important source of power 
for the franchisee, impeding franchisors from adopting a punitive approach to non-
compliance.  
 
Monitoring. Monitoring mechanisms mirror those found in previous franchise studies: the use 
of a regional supervisor and technological equipment. Franchisors in the convenience store 
sector place more emphasis on control compared with their counterparts in the shopping 
goods sector. The use of technological equipment as a means to control the franchisee is 
emphasized in this sector.  
 
For the franchisee, monitoring is a controversial issue. A large proportion of franchisees are 
unhappy with the frequent change of regional supervisor, insufficient help and inefficient 
response of the supervisor. Furthermore, some franchisees believe that the presence of a 
regional supervisor indicates they are not trusted by the franchisor.  
 
Sources of conflict in the relationship 
Franchisee non-compliance. The major example of non-compliance in these franchise 
relationships is the unethical behaviour displayed by some franchisees who sell products not 
approved by the franchisor. It is particularly common in the convenience store sector. Even if 
franchisees do not use these unauthorised channels, they are aware of their existence. The 
franchisee owner in Company G says it is “too complicated” and he is unwilling to “get into 
trouble with the company” because he perceives that he and the company “have been getting 
on well”. 
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Company H provides a telling example of a franchisee deliberately ignoring the franchisor’s 
instructions in a remote market unfamiliar to the franchisor:   
I am the one who has personal connections, knowledge of the market, and helps to 
promote the brand into the market… I was a wholesaler in this market before I started 
operating a franchise business, so I knew this industry and this market very well… As 
a franchisee I respected their advice most of the time, but sometimes when I knew 
their way was not going to work in my business I would just ignore them. (Company 
H, franchisee respondent) 
 
Non-compliance also occurs when franchisees are sceptical of franchisor arrangements. This 
includes system improvement. Franchisees are often suspicious of new systems and unwilling 
to bear the cost related to the installation of new equipment and to participate in further 
training. 
 
Logistical problems. Price competitiveness is the main reason convenience store franchisees 
purchase product from unauthorised suppliers. The franchisor CEO from Company G 
indicates that the main impediment to offering competitive prices remains the high cost of 
logistics and the lack of bargaining power to negotiate a lower price with upstream product 
suppliers. 
Franchisors’ logistics capability is found to be strongly influenced by two issues: poor 
delivery capacity across large geographic areas and an inability to accurately estimate 
fluctuations in product demand. Notably, the larger, more experienced, franchisors receive 
fewer complaints from franchisees. The importance of the issue is succinctly expressed by 
one franchisee: ‘All I want from [Company E] is to deliver the products on time.’ 
These logistical problems demonstrate a franchise system growing rapidly in geographic 
terms but lacking infrastructure and economies of scale. This causes dissatisfaction amongst 
franchisees and the potential for conflict in the system.  
 
Counterfeit goods. Particularly important in the shopping goods sector is the presence of 
counterfeit goods in the marketplace. This issue is different from the behaviour discussed 
above, in that franchisees do not source these products for their own stores. Franchisees 
remain concerned that franchisors are not doing enough to protect the brand from 
counterfeiting. 
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To protect franchisees from counterfeits, most franchisors claim that they are prepared to 
resort to legal action but they cannot act until they catch a counterfeiter. To counteract 
counterfeiting, Company A encourages customers to shop at its legitimate outlets. Company 
B emphasises that is not only the responsibility of the franchisor to act against counterfeiting:  
The company has responsibility to protect its franchisees from suffering loss from 
piracies and counterfeits.... Franchisees should also be responsible for protecting 
themselves and our brand. (Company B, franchisor respondent) 
 
Managing non-compliance. Case company franchisors employ coercive and non-coercive 
sources of power to manage franchisee non-compliance. Franchise contracts stipulate a series 
of punitive measures that will be taken if either party breaches the contract but, in practice, 
franchisors seldom invoke the contract to modify franchisees’ non-compliance behaviour. 
Franchisors prefer to employ non-coercive power, mainly through communication; however, 
if non-compliance continues they are prepared to employ much stronger coercion and 
possible contract termination.  
 
Acknowledging that franchisees sometimes engage in non-compliance behaviour as a result 
of poor infrastructure and support, Companies F, G, H and I addressed non-compliance 
through system improvements. Company G equipped franchise stores with an inventory 
management system which helps franchisees to better manage their stock and allows the 
franchisor to closely monitor franchisees. To improve the monitoring system, Company F 
installed a data transmission system. Company I invested in improving their logistics 
infrastructure by developing a company-owned logistics centre and company-managed teams.  
 
For the franchisor respondent in Company A, “rigidly enforcing franchisees to correct their 
non-compliance by threatening and fining can achieve nothing but complicate the 
relationship and make future communication harder”. For Company F the balance of power 
lies with the franchisees that have good store locations, therefore impeding the taking of 
punitive action:  
Franchisees that break the rules and regulations, such as selling things that are not 
on our approval list in the shop, change the store layout and purchase products from 
other suppliers without our permission, are mostly those former grocery store 
owners… Cancelling the franchise contract is definitely not an option… (franchisor 
respondent) 
 
Support mechanisms  
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Franchisors provide franchisees with a range of support mechanisms: marketing, specialized 
training, product improvement and development. Marketing support, as stipulated in the 
contract, takes the form of promotion of the brand, organization of marketing campaigns and 
the management of public relations. Shopping goods franchisees particularly emphasize the 
importance of support for product improvement and development.  
 
Legal requirements and their impact on the franchise relationship 
Estimations of ROI. As required by legislation, franchisors provide estimations of franchisees 
potential investment returns at the pre-contractual stage. The aim of estimating return on 
investment is to help set franchisee expectations at a realistic level from the outset. Business 
format franchisors prove to be more conservative in estimating return on investment. Over 
exaggerating return on investment will increase franchisees expectations and has the potential 
to cause conflict in the relationship when they are not met.  
Secure opt-out system. The second legal requirement is the secure opt-out system whereby 
franchisors provide a simple secure opt-out system when the franchisee wants to withdraw 
from the existing franchise business. Before the contract set up stage, franchisors receive 
frequent enquiries from prospective franchisees regarding withdrawal procedures. Since most 
franchisees are new to franchising, and risk averse, they require financial reassurance. The 
simple and safe opt-out system is more likely to enhance franchisees confidence in the 
venture and attract more franchisees.  
Social factors 
Development of emotional bonding is important within franchise relationships. The 
franchisor garners franchisee support by organizing periodic gatherings for immigrant 
franchisees new to a particular city. Some franchisors hold outdoor activities for their 
franchisees to meet company staff. For the franchisor, these activities enhance franchisee 
sense of belonging to the company. Franchisors consider that the relationship between the 
franchisor and the franchisee is not a purely financial one. The development of emotional 
bonds facilitates problem solving at the social level through negotiation and communication.  
 
Franchisees welcome these trust building periodic gatherings. It allows them to build a much-
needed sense of belonging to their new home town. The time franchisees spend with 
franchisor representatives is a source of emotional affiliation which pre-empts conflict:  
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The supervisor is quite nice. She is a woman of my age. We feel like a friend to each 
other. As a result I dare not say anything about my opinions to her… I do not want to 
destroy the relationship with the company… (Company I, franchisee respondent) 
 
This time spent together engenders tolerance and comprehension, as highlighted by the 
franchisee from Company I:  
Although dissatisfaction and misunderstandings happen sometimes, I emotionally feel 
closer to the company, as we get to know each other more. (Company I, franchisee) 
 
The longer the relationship the more likely it is that the franchisee will build an emotional 
attachment to the franchisor. This is more prevalent in the business format franchising 
context because these franchisors have a longer term vision and will put a greater effort into 
promoting the franchisee’s sense of belonging to the company.  
 
Discussion 
TAKE IN TABLE V HERE 
  
Table V details the main sources of power, control, support, and conflict in the franchise 
relationship in China, from the perspective of both franchisors and franchisees. While the 
sources of power and control for franchisors largely conform to established understanding, 
that is, control through the contract, brand, support and so on (Doherty and Alexander, 2006; 
Frazer et al., 2007; Lusch, 1976), it is the franchisee sources of power and control which 
exhibit fundamentally different characteristics. Those franchisees which possess important 
locations for their retail outlets are able to exert significant power and control in the 
relationship, resulting in franchisors not wishing to exert contractual power. Support services 
offered to franchisees, such as marketing, training and monitoring have also been explored in 
previous studies (Doherty, 2007; McIntyre, 1996; Quinn, 1999). It is support via prior 
disclosure and the secure opt-out system which provides important insights, as these are 
support issues which the franchisor must provide to franchisees following the implementation 
of franchise legislation in China. Franchisees in this study derive extra confidence and 
reassurance from the legally required support mechanisms when making the decision to enter 
into a franchise relationship. 
 
Sources of conflict in the franchise relationship serve to highlight the rapidly evolving nature 
of franchising in China. Convenience store franchisees, regardless of the type of franchising 
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being operated, are likely to cause conflict in the franchise system by purchasing product 
from unauthorised sources, acting against franchisor recommendations by using the market 
knowledge they possess as a result of previous experience in retailing and being unwilling to 
bear the costs of improving systems. Convenience store franchisors acknowledge that in 
many cases such franchisee behaviour is a result of underdeveloped franchise system 
infrastructure. For the shopping goods sector, the presence of counterfeit goods in the 
marketplace causes conflict as franchisees feel that the franchisor should be doing more to 
combat the problem. Franchisors acknowledge they have very limited ability to deal with the 
issue. The prior disclosure and estimation of return process and the secure opt out or ‘cooling 
off’ period embedded in the franchise contract mitigate against the type of conflict evident in 
the recent work of Frazer et al. (2012) which resulted from an expectation gap at the outset of 
the relationship. Likewise, conflict is mitigated through the various social events franchisors 
organise for franchisees and the building of relationships with the regional supervisor. 
 
Theoretically, horizontal agency problems in the form of free riding (Combs et al., 2004a; 
Kidwell et al., 2007) do not emerge as a problem within these franchise relationships: even 
within the business format franchise systems where it is most likely to occur due to the 
presence of strong brands. The franchise brand was highlighted as being very important in the 
initial decision to franchise for both business format franchisors and franchisees. Free riding 
infers a franchise system which is centered on a well established brand. It may be the case 
that these franchise systems are still developing, therefore brand strength is also evolving. 
However, what is witnessed in the franchise market in China is free riding occurring outside 
the franchise system in the form of counterfeiting. Using agency theory, free riding is viewed 
as an internal concept within the franchise system. The developing institutional context in 
China provides a view of free riding which is external to the franchise system but which has a 
positive effect within the system. In effect, the presence of counterfeiting outside the 
franchise system may well act as a barrier to free riding within it. This leads to the first 
proposition: 
P1: In a developing institutional environment which offers limited brand protection, 
free riding outside a franchise system will mitigate against the occurrence of free riding 
within the system 
 
By employing institutional theory we can explain aspects of the franchise relationship which 
lie outside the explanatory power of agency theory. While institutional frameworks are 
characterised by their dynamic and evolving nature, this is particularly so in an environment 
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which witnessed its first piece of franchise legislation as recently as 1997. This legal 
framework continues to evolve, and the contract, which underpins other theories of 
franchising, is at an earlier level of development and maturity in China compared with other 
institutionally developed franchise contexts such as the UK, US and Australia where much 
previous research has been located (Shane and Foo, 1999; Brookes and Roper, 2011; Meek et 
al., 2011; Frazer et al., 2012). It is also within this developing institutional framework that 
counterfeiting thrives and franchisors have very limited recourse. The latter is a particular 
issue for the shopping goods franchisors which rely on their brand and the quality of their 
products to develop their franchise networks.  The normative pillar (Scott, 2008) suggests 
behaviour is constrained by values and norms: transgression produces shame or disgrace. In 
China, a developing institutional context, the widespread existence of counterfeiting is a 
relatively accepted ‘norm’ in society. Counterfeiting is taken for granted behaviour, from 
which the developing franchise system needs protection. However, with a regulatory pillar in 
its relatively early stage of development, protecting franchisors and franchisees against 
counterfeiting remains a particular challenge. Further, there is a taken for grantedness which 
helps to explain convenience store franchisees buying product from unauthorised sources. As 
with counterfeiting, only when the regulative pillar is further established, and the ‘norm’ in 
the system means franchisees understand that they must abide by the legal requirements of 
the franchise contract, will this cultural cognitive norm reverse. Following North (1990), the 
political structure must provide the foundation for the enforcement of the contract. In some 
way, the cognitive legitimacy evident in the work of Shane and Foo (1999) is reversed in 
China, that is, the long standing shared understanding in China allows for counterfeiting and 
purchasing of product from unauthorised sources. This leads to the second proposition: 
P2: In a developing institutional context, where cultural cognitive norms have the 
potential to undermine the power of franchise contracts, a stronger regulatory pillar 
will overcome deviant taken for grantedness behaviour  
 
While evidence of horizontal agency does not emerge from the findings, agency theory is 
shown to have explanatory power when viewed in terms of the vertical agency problem. 
Opportunism and moral hazard are prevalent within these franchise relationships, particularly 
within the convenience store sector. There are numerous examples of franchisees operating 
opportunistically by purchasing product from suppliers other than the franchisor. According 
to agency theory, power resides in the franchise contract and by inference the franchisor is 
more powerful that the franchisee (Combs et al., 2004a; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Mathewson and Winter, 1985). However, in China, when franchisees possess prime 
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locations, franchisors are largely unwilling to invoke the contract punitively. This is a 
particular problem where franchisees derive market knowledge from previous experience 
within the retail sector. This leads to the following propositions: 
P3: Vertical agency problems are more likely to arise when franchisees possess previous 
retail experience and prime retail locations 
 
P4: The lack of a developed regulatory institutional environment results in the potential 
for vertical agency problems  
 
Within a rapidly evolving franchise network some franchisors admit that their infrastructure 
is not sufficiently developed, particularly in terms of logistics and replenishment, which 
makes contract enforcement difficult. Convenience store franchisees are particularly price 
driven. When they think they are not receiving sufficiently competitive prices from their 
franchisor there is a greater likelihood that they will source from other channels. Franchisors 
have recourse to the contract but they acknowledge that sometimes it is the limitations of 
their systems which instigate franchisees non-compliance. This leads to the fifth proposition: 
P5: Vertical agency problems will occur in a rapidly evolving franchise market when 
franchisors lack sufficient franchise network infrastructure 
 
In order to attempt to minimize vertical agency, monitoring occurs via the regional supervisor 
and technological equipment. Convenience goods retailers monitor via information systems 
to ensure franchisees are adhering to their contract and not sourcing product from 
unauthorized channels. Many convenience store franchisors monitor with limited success. 
Shopping goods retailers, with their emphasis on the brand and business format franchising, 
do not exhibit the same vertical agency issues; therefore, franchise form and retail sector are 
important in this regard. Convenience store franchisees are more likely to behave 
opportunistically and therefore cause conflict in the system. The franchise relationships in 
this sector tend to operate at the discreet transactional end of the relationship continuum. In 
contrast, shopping goods business format franchisors operate in a context where the longer 
term relationship is more important than the individual transactions which occur (Kaufmann 
and Stern, 1988). Evidence from the business format franchisors in the current work supports 
Spinelli and Birley’s (1996) contention that support is central to relationship development 
and tolerance. This leads to propositions six and seven: 
P6: Agency problems are contingent on franchise form and retail sector 
P7: Transactional franchise relationships are more likely to lead to conflict in the 
franchise system 
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Following Giddens’ (1984), DiMaggio (1991) emphasizes the importance institutional theory 
places on government agencies and trade associations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). These 
agencies and associations are crucial to the definition of an industry and the emergence of 
networks, both formal and informal which support, police and/or set policy with regard to the 
industry. The data collection phase highlighted this defining process within the franchise 
industry in China. The CCFA and government agencies give a legitimization to franchising in 
the country and as such provide a key basis for understanding institutional development. This 
leads to the eighth proposition: 
P8: Defining the franchise industry in a developing institutional environment leads to 
legitimacy and provides a basis for institution building within this context 
 
The implementation of key elements of the legal framework noted in Table One (Franchise 
Measures 2005 and Franchise Regulations 2007) is highlighted in the findings. Franchisors’ 
prior disclosure of return on investment estimations and the secure opt out or ‘cooling off’ 
period are all evidenced here. Their importance in giving franchisees confidence at the outset 
of the relationship cannot be underestimated. This echoes the work of Shane and Foo (1999) 
who find that disclosure laws encourage potential franchisees into the franchise system, with 
regulation providing important legitimacy for the industry. The Franchise Regulations 2007 
note that franchisors must provide support to franchisees, but the legislation is quite general 
in terms of support expectation. Findings reveal a range of support mechanisms in operation 
within the case firms. Therefore, while the evolving nature of the institutional environment is 
acknowledged, the legislation which does exist is being implemented.  
 
The nature and importance of personal connections and information exchange also emerge as 
important cultural-cognitive dimensions of the franchise relationship, as are the social factors 
emphasised by both franchisors and franchisees. When franchisees begin to develop closer 
personal bonds with their regional supervisor they begin to feel closer to the company as a 
whole. Periodic gatherings organised by franchisors help to build trust with franchisees. 
Many franchisees have moved from the countryside to the cities, therefore such gatherings 
and involvement with the franchise system provide a sense of belonging. Further, information 
exchange between franchisees acts as a source of power for them. On a negative note, those 
franchisees with previous retail experience also draw on their personal networks to procure 
product from outside the franchise system. This leads to the penultimate proposition: 
P9: Personal connectivity present in the franchise relationship moderates cultural-
cognitive dimensions within the institutional environment    
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Combs et al. (2009) emphasise the pressure to conform inherent in institutional theory which 
bring isomorphic pressures to bear on firms within the same industry. If we take the two retail 
sectors considered here, we can see evidence of isomorphic pressures. The convenience store 
sector is more concerned with price and its implications whereas the shopping goods sector is 
more concerned with brand and product quality. This leads to the final proposition: 
P10: In a developing institutional environment, isomorphic pressures present 
themselves at the retail sectoral level rather than the industry level 
 
Combs et al. (2009) acknowledge that their study only explored institutional theory’s 
explanatory power for firms’ propensity to franchise. The current work explores the franchise 
relationship holistically and therefore offers a further extension of their work in terms of the 
role institutional theory can play in our understanding of the ongoing franchising relationship 
outside the traditional economic perspectives which have dominated the literature for more 
than four decades. 
 
Implications for franchising practice 
 
Franchisors and franchisees already operating or considering entering into a franchise 
relationship in China must be aware that while franchising as an organizational form is 
growing, it is still at an early level of development. Franchising legislation does exist and it 
requires franchisors to provide support to franchisees, as well as financial reassurances which 
come from prior disclosure and the secure opt-out system. These issues encouraged 
franchisees in the current study to enter into the franchise system. That said, the institutional 
framework remains relatively weak and contract enforcement is difficult, particularly in the 
convenience store sector for those firms not practicing business format franchising. 
Franchisors would be advised to build and develop strong brands which would allow them to 
develop a business franchise format. This attracts franchisees that understand the power of 
the brand and are therefore less likely to act outside the system. Without a strong brand, many 
convenience store franchisors are simply employing franchising to distribute product and are 
reliant on a distribution system without strong infrastructure. This weakens their position vis-
a-vis franchisees in a highly competitive, price-driven market place.  
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Across sectors and franchise forms, support mechanisms help to develop the franchise 
relationship. Investment in these support mechanisms is crucial for long-term success. 
Franchisors should be aware of the important role the regional supervisor plays in 
maintaining stability in the relationship and reducing the potential for conflict in the system. 
Potential franchisees would be advised to explore the support mechanisms a prospective 
franchisor purports to provide. Only prior disclosure and the secure opt-out system are 
specifically detailed in the legislation.  
 
Conclusion, limitations and areas of future research 
 
This is an exploratory qualitative study and is therefore subject to the limitations of the 
method. The study is not intended to be generalizable but these data are deemed to be of 
value in themselves, providing thick descriptions and rich details (Cope, 2011). That only one 
geographic area of China is addressed could be deemed a limitation of the current work. 
However, the Pearl River Delta is a very developed area of China and it is a region which has 
been the site of previous related studies such as Bruton and Ahlstrom’s (2003) work 
exploring the differences between western venture capitalism and that which occurs in China. 
Franchisee informants in the current work were secured via their franchisor. There is the 
potential that franchisors chose their ‘best’ franchisee. However, with the assurances of 
confidentiality we are confident respondents discussed issues honestly: that a range of 
conflict sources were found is testament to that. Finally, this study is focused on two sectoral 
groups within retailing, shopping goods and convenience stores. This was a result of the 
sampling procedure (Cope, 2011) and all participant companies met the criteria set for 
inclusion in the study.  
 
On the basis of this work carried out in an under-researched marketplace, several areas are 
recommended for further study. First, much franchise research assumes business format 
franchising is being practiced. The current work reveals that in an emerging franchise system 
this cannot be assumed, as in the case of some of the convenience store franchisors in the 
current work. Much franchise research is characterised by theoretical positions that explain 
the initial decision to franchise rather than the mechanisms of the franchise relationship. The 
current work supports Doherty and Alexander (2004) and Meek et al. (2011) in their calls for 
researchers to consider the process of franchise relationship development. In the context of 
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China, two areas of research could prove particularly rewarding: a longitudinal study which 
explores how franchise relationships develop over time within the changing institutional 
environment; a study which explores relationship terminations and conversion from one 
franchise system to another.  
 
This paper contributes to our knowledge of franchising in numerous ways. First, it provides 
an account of the legislative context within which franchising in China operates. Secondly, 
through securing access to nine franchise networks and providing evidence from both 
franchisors and franchisees, the findings presented demonstrate that power, control, support 
and conflict are all present in the franchise relationship in China. This work supports the 
shared view of Shane and Foo (1999) and Combs et al. (2009) that institutional theory can 
provide social explanations for franchising. This is particularly relevant in an environment 
where the institutional framework is still evolving. However, it is also important to note the 
robustness of the explanatory power of agency theory (in the context of vertical agency) in a 
market environment outside which it is normally applied. The lack of horizontal agency in 
the form of free riding is particularly interesting when viewed in light of institutional 
weakness where brand protection is limited and where counterfeiting is endemic. A dedicated 
study of business format franchisors across sectors would elucidate whether free riding is not 
an issue generally in China and whether the endemic counterfeiting present in the market 
does act as a barrier to free riding in franchise systems in this developing institutional 
context. Moreover, an exploration of this ‘external’ free riding issue in the form of 
counterfeiting as it occurs in other developing institutional contexts outside China would 
further our understanding of horizontal agency issues in alternative settings to those which 
currently dominate the literature. 
 
As the regulatory environment becomes more firmly established, it is important to understand 
how cultural cognitive norms change and how this changing institutional environment 
impacts on deviant taken for grantedness behaviour. In addition, an in-depth study into the 
social factors which moderate the franchise relationship could prove particularly insightful. A 
larger quantitative study could discern whether the particular vertical agency issues 
highlighted in the current work are prevalent across other franchise sectors such as hotels. It 
would also be valuable to understand how isomorphic pressures present themselves across 
other franchise sectors. Studies which explore these issues in other countries where 
institutional frameworks are at an early stage of development could have further theoretical 
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implications. Understanding the process of how franchise industries achieve legitimacy and 
definition would be particularly useful. 
 
Finally, it is clear that the addition of institutional theory provides a more holistic 
understanding of the franchising relationship in an emerging franchise market. This has 
implications for our understanding of developed markets. Therefore we would caution against 
assumptions that traditional economics-based franchising theory fully explains franchise 
activity in developed economies.  
 
One of the major strengths of the current work is deemed to be the securing of access to both 
franchisors and franchisees in order to explore the franchise relationship. The complexity and 
difficulty of continuing work in this vein should not be underestimated by the academic 
community. The paper has detailed the process of accessing these franchise networks and it is 
hoped that this will aid researchers in their future endeavours to research franchise issues in 
China. 
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Table I: Key Tenets of Agency Theory and Institutional Theory 
 
Agency Theory Institutional Theory 
Key concepts (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) 
• Principal-agent relationship 
• Information asymmetry (IA)* 
• Moral hazard 
• Monitoring costs 
• Contracts 
Three pillars of institutionalism form the 
basis for legitimacy (Scott, 2008) 
• Regulative 
• Normative  
• Cultural cognitive  
 
 
• Horizontal agency problem: potential 
for free riding 
• Regulative systems must be enforced 
by a legitimate state 
• Coercion key control mechanism  
• Has much in common with agency 
perspectives 
 
• Vertical agency problem: potential for 
employees (agents) to operate in their 
own self-interest against the interests 
of management (principal) 
• Normative systems involve values 
and norms that impose constraints on 
society 
• ‘The regulative and normative pillars 
can be mutually reinforcing; (Scott, 
2008, p.53) 
 
• Hierarchical dependent relationship 
with coercion the key method of 
control 
• Cultural cognitive systems involve a 
‘taken-for grantedness’, the way 
things are done 
 
• Well established application of 
agency theory in the franchising 
context beginning with Rubin (1978) 
Limited but growing understanding of 
the potential of institutional theory for 
understanding franchising (Shane and 
Foo, 1999; Combs et al., 2009; 
Barthelemy, 2011) 
Note*: IA is not a problem in itself in the principal agent relationship. It becomes a problem 
when combined with moral hazard, that is the potential for the agent to act in his/her own 
interest against the interests of the principal 
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Table II: Franchise Regulation Development in China 
Date  Law Key Measures Significance 
November 
1997 
Interim Measures 
on the 
Administration of 
Commercial 
Franchise 
Operations (Trial 
Implementation) 
 
Described how franchising worked as opposed to setting out 
specific rules and regulation 
First official recognition of 
franchising as a distinct business 
model signalling official 
encouragement to engage in 
franchising in China 
 
Only applied to domestic 
franchisors 
Adopted 30 
December 
2004, took 
effect 
1 February 
2005 
Measures for the 
Administration of 
Commercial 
Franchise 
Operations  
 
Requires all franchising activity to adhere to principles of 
‘voluntariness, fair dealing, honesty and credibility’ 
 
Key tenets: Rights and obligations of both parties, prior disclosure 
and content of franchise agreement covered 
 
Permits a franchisor to grant either a master franchise or direct 
franchise which allows the franchisee to sub-franchise 
 
Franchise term must be at least 3 years 
 
Franchisors must have at least two directly owned stores operating 
in China for a period of at least one year in order to qualify as a 
franchisor (2+1 rule) 
 
International franchisors must apply to engage in franchising by 
submitting a series of documentation including business license, 
proof of qualification to be a franchisor, franchise agreement, 
franchise manual and prior disclosure information including 
audited financial statements, information about existing 
franchisees, information regarding all litigation during 5 years 
preceding a franchise agreement 
 
Franchisees are subject to confidentiality agreements for the 
duration, and following the potential termination of a franchise 
agreement 
Replaced the 1997 measures and 
implements the Regulations on 
Foreign Investments in 
Commercial Industry which 
became effective on 1 June 2004  
 
Necessary due to WTO 
accession in 2001 
 
Covers both domestic and 
international franchisors 
 
Somewhat confusing, for 
example, the Measures fail to 
address cross-border franchising 
between foreign franchisors and 
domestic Chinese franchisees 
 
Confusing with regard to how 
the 2+1 rule effects international 
franchisors 
 
 
 
Adopted 31 
January 
2007, took 
effect 1 
May 2007  
 
Regulations on 
the 
Administration of 
Commercial 
Franchises 
 
Overrides any parts of the Measures that contradict the Regulation 
 
Filing Rules and Disclosure Rules issued to help enforce the 
Regulation 
 
Attempts to counteract domestic franchise fraud 
 
Only corporations, not individuals, can become franchisors 
 
Franchisors must have a mature business that can provide 
sufficient support to franchisees including a franchise manual, 
training and other services. However, the Regulation is not specific 
on exactly what support must be provided   
 
Franchisors must disclose all relevant information in order that 
franchisees make informed investment decisions when entering 
into a franchise agreement 
 
Registration must take place within 15days of a franchisor entering 
into a franchise agreement.  
 
The franchise agreement must contain specific issues such as a 
‘cooling-off’ period and franchisees are bound to confidentiality 
with regard to franchisors trade secrets  
Attempts to address certain 
ambiguities, particularly with 
regard to international franchise 
arrangements 
 
Some elements of ambiguity 
still apply with regard to the 2+1 
rule but the requirement that 
ownership must be in China has 
been removed 
 
As a result of ambiguity it 
remains to be seen how 
enforcement will operate 
 
Source: Adapted from www.franchise–update.com/article/316, accessed 18/09/2009; 
www.franchisebusiness.com.au/c/DC-Strategy/China-The-New-Franchise-Frontier-n852223 accessed 
18/11/2011; www.fargre.com/showarticle.aspx?Show=2981&PrintPage=True, accessed 19/09/2009; 
www.asiabizblog.com/archives/2007/03/guest_column_ch.htmaccessed 18/11/2011 
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Table III: The Case Companies 
 
 
Case Franchisor 
Respondent 
Length of 
Interview 
(approx) 
Franchisee 
Respondent 
Length of 
Interview 
(approx) 
First Year 
Franchising 
in China 
Retail Sector Origin 
A  Franchisor 
representative 
in China 
60 
minutes 
Franchisee 
owner 
45 minutes 2003 Shopping 
Goods - 
Kitchenware 
US 
B Franchise 
manager 
45 
minutes 
Franchisee 
owner 
50 minutes 2000 Shopping 
Goods – 
Health 
Products  
China 
C Franchise 
manager 
90 
minutes 
Franchisee 
owner 
45 minutes 2004 Shopping 
Goods – 
Health 
Products 
China 
D CEO 60 
minutes 
Franchisee 
owner 
50 minutes 2004 Convenience 
stores 
China 
E Franchise 
manager 
45 
minutes 
Franchisee 
owner 
45 minutes 2004 Convenience 
stores 
China 
F Franchise 
manager 
60 
minutes 
Franchisee 
owner 
45 minutes 2004 Convenience 
stores 
China 
G CEO 50 
minutes 
Franchisee 
owner 
45 minutes 2004 Convenience 
stores 
China 
H Franchise 
manager 
120 
minutes 
CEO (master 
franchisee) 
75 minutes 2006 Convenience 
stores 
China/
Hong 
Kong 
I Franchise 
manager 
75 
minutes 
Franchisee 
owner 
60 minutes 1998 Convenience 
stores 
China 
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Table IV: Interview Guide: Thematic Issues and Within Theme Issues Explored in 
Franchisor and Franchisee Interviews  
 
Thematic Issues Within theme issues to explore 
Company franchise history  Year of start up, how many people are employed, 
company size 
 Industry and competitive environment at the point of 
entry into franchising and how it has evolved 
 Why and how the franchise business started 
  
Establishing franchise relationships How franchise partner(s) are selected and the criteria 
(if any) which are employed to choose partner(s) 
 How the franchise relationship was established 
  
Day-to-day operation of the franchise business Structure of the franchise operation 
 Rules, regulations and terms and conditions of the 
franchise contracts 
 How the franchisee/franchisor operates the business 
 How the franchisor/franchisee perceives the state of 
the franchise operations 
  
Support  How support operates and the main methods of 
support 
 The context for support implementation 
 How the franchisor/franchisee perceives the support 
given by/received from the counterpart and why  it is 
perceived this way 
 The importance of support for the franchise 
relationship 
  
Control How control is maintained/exerted and the main 
methods of control in the relationship 
 The context for control implementation 
 How the franchisor/franchisee perceives control in the 
relationship and why  it is perceived this way 
 How control impacts on the franchise relationship 
  
Conflict Indicators of conflict 
 Antecedents of conflict 
 Resolutions to conflict 
 How the franchisor/franchisee perceives conflict in the 
relationship and why  it is perceived this way 
 How conflict impacts on the franchise relationship 
  
Power Sources of franchisor/franchisee power 
 How power is exercised 
 How the franchisor/franchisee perceives power in the 
relationship and why  it is perceived this way 
 How power impacts on the franchise relationship 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 32 of 33European Journal of Marketing
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
Table V: Sources of Power, Control, Support and Conflict in Retail Franchise 
Relationships in China 
 
 
 
 Franchisor Franchisee 
Power and Control 
 
 
• Contract 
• Brand 
• Market information 
• Support services 
• System infrastructure 
 
• Store location 
• Market information 
e.g. alternative 
sourcing channels 
• Information exchange 
between franchisees 
Support Services 
 
 
• Marketing support 
• Product quality and 
cost 
• Operational support 
o Training 
o Logistics 
o Monitoring 
(regional 
supervisor and 
IT equipment) 
• Initial estimation of 
return on investment 
• Secure opt-out 
• Periodic gatherings 
and team building 
 
Sources of Conflict 
 
 
 
 
• Lack of competitive 
pricing 
• Poor logistics and 
transportation 
infrastructure 
• Franchisee 
perceptions that 
franchisor not 
sufficiently effective 
against the presence 
of counterfeit goods 
in market 
• Purchasing products 
from unauthorised 
channels 
• Experienced 
franchisees with local 
market knowledge 
acting against 
franchisor 
recommendations 
• Lack of willingness 
to bear costs of 
improving systems 
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